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At the Intersection of Legal Ethics and
Globalization: International Conflicts of
Law in Lawyer Regulation
Hans-Jiirgen Hellwig*
I.

DOUBLE DEONTOLOGY

The regulation of the legal profession in Europe is within the
competency of the Member States.
So far there has been no
harmonization by European Union ("EU") legislation. While very few
Member States, with regards to regulation of the legal profession, have
choice of law rules, no such conflict rules exist at EU level. This means
as a consequence that whenever a lawyer works cross-border he is
subject to his home country regulatory rules and to the host country
regulatory rules at the same time-a phenomenon referred to in Europe
as "double deontology."
This double deontology is specifically
recognized in the lawyer-specific directives of 1977 on temporary crossborder services and that of 1998 on cross-border establishment. The
double deontology is also recognized in the Council of Bars and Law
Societies of Europe's ("CCBE") Code of Conduct.
There are two kinds of double deontology which will be discussed
in the following on the basis of a few examples.

* The author is a retired partner with the firm Hengeler Mueller and a past
president of the Council of the Bars and Law Societies of Europe. This article is based
on the author's presentation on May 5, 2008, at the Fifth International Meeting of the
Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers in Amsterdam.
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II.

DIFFERING DEONTOLOGY

A.

Conflict of Interest Prohibition

I.
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Definition

Germany has a narrow legal definition. A conflict of interest in
which the lawyer is prohibited to act exists only if the two mandates
involve, in whole or in part, the same legal matter.
France has basically the same narrow definition; however, a broader
prohibition to act can follow from the rules on "dM1icatesse" in case there
exists the risk that factual knowledge from one mandate can flow into
another mandate in a different matter in the legal sense. In other words,
secrecy aspects can impose additional prohibitions to act.
England and Wales have a prohibition to act whenever there is a
conflict in the same or related legal matters.
An even broader definition is to be found in Austria where any
commercial conflict triggers the prohibition to act, including conflicts
from unrelated legal matters.
Let me give you an example. A German lawyer from Lindau,
which is a city on the Lake of Constance, advises a German client who is
a purchaser in a commercial sales transaction. He accompanies him to
Bregenz, which is an Austrian city 10 kilometers away, also on the Lake
of Constance, for negotiations with the Austrian seller. The seller is
represented by an Austrian lawyer. The German lawyer representing the
purchaser knows the seller rather well because he gives legal advice to
the seller in a leasehold matter in Germany. The leasehold matter is a
matter completely different from the commercial sales transaction.
When the German lawyer enters the conference room, he is requested by
the Austrian lawyer to resign from representing his German client, the
purchaser, in the sales transaction because the interests of such client in
that matter are opposed to the interests of his other client, the Austrian
client, in the leasehold matter.
2.

Client Waiver?

In France, Germany, and Austria the conflict of interest prohibition
cannot be waived by the client.
Professional regulation in England and Wales does not permit a
waiver either. However, professional regulation is, in factual life,
superseded by civil law which knows countervailing duties of
confidentiality and disclosure where a waiver is permissible. If the
waiver is given by both parties, the lawyer does not violate his duties
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under civil law, and the violation of professional regulation has no
consequences because it is not brought to the attention of the competent
professional bodies. This is different when the waiver is given by one
party only. A lawyer acting on the basis of one waiver only runs the risk
that the other client applies for an injunction under civil law and brings
charges against him for violation of professional regulation.
3.

Law Finn Dimension?

This is the question of whether the mandate of one lawyer creates a
conflict of interest prohibition for the other lawyers in the firm. This is
the case in France, Austria, and England and Wales. It is also the case in
Germany; however, with the proviso that, in the law firm dimension of
the prohibition, a waiver is possible under certain conditions. The clients
after comprehensive written information can give their express waiver
provided that the needs of the justice system, which requires that the
lawyer represents the interests of the client in an independent, secrecy
bound and integral manner, are not opposed to the waiver. In other
words two conditions must be met, namely both clients must waive, and,
there must not be opposing needs of the justice system.
The prevailing view in Germany is that needs of the justice system
are not opposed if, in a bidding process, a law firm represents several
bidders who have given their consent because the lawyers in question
operate with Chinese walls. However, when a defeated bidder goes to
court to challenge the victory of the successful bidder, the law firm
cannot represent either client because the needs of the justice system are
opposed to plaintiff and defendant being represented in court by the same
law firm.
B.

Secrecy/ConfidentialityObligation
1.

What is a Secret?

Is a secret only what the client confides to the lawyer? Or is a
secret everything that the lawyer learns in the mandate, including third
party information? The answers in Europe differ from country to
country.
2.

Waiver?

In Germany and England and Wales, a waiver is possible with
regard to information coming from the client, because the client is the
master of the secret. France, Belgium, and Luxembourg do not accept a
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waiver because in those countries the secrecy obligation follows from the
professional status of the lawyer in the justice system.
3.

Correspondence Between Lawyers

The aforesaid difference can become quite relevant in the case of
correspondence between lawyers from different countries. A letter
which is sent by a French lawyer to another lawyer with the specific
mention "confidential" or "under privilege" must, under French rules,
not be disclosed by the recipient lawyer to his client. Germany and other
countries do not accept such secrecy vis-A-vis their own clients. In these
countries, the client has a legal right to be fully informed by his lawyer,
even as far as his correspondence with the other lawyer is concerned.
4.

Law Firm Dimension

All countries in Europe recognize that the secrecy/confidentiality
obligation applies not only to the acting lawyer but also to all other
members of the firm.
C.

R~sum6

As
regards
conflicts
of
interest
prohibition
and
secrecy/confidentiality obligation, which are both core values of the legal
profession, the core is identical; the margins, however, differ from
country to country. With specific regard to double deontology, there is
only one practical consequence following therefrom:
whichever
regulation is stricter on any given aspect, such regulation applies.
III. CONFLICTING DEONTOLOGY
The typical situation is the clash between reporting/disclosure and
secrecy/confidentiality obligations.
The best known examples of reporting obligations are in the areas
of money laundering and the fight against terrorism. England and Wales
and the Netherlands have very far-reaching reporting obligations that go
well beyond the applicable EU Directives-these countries have "goldplated" the EU legislation. Other countries such as Germany and France
have limited their national laws to the minimum required under the
Directives.
These differences in national implementation of EU legislation can
have severe consequences as the following example shows. A German
lawyer working in London, be it temporarily or in an office in London, is
subject to English reporting obligations because he is working in
England. At the same time, he remains subject to his German
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secrecy/confidentiality obligations. This means that, looking at the
difference in scope of English and German reporting obligations, such
lawyer can be subject to English reporting obligations on the one hand
and German secrecy/confidentiality obligations on the other hand. This
is a true catch-22 situation, particularly when one considers that both the
violation of the English reporting obligation and the violation of the
German secrecy/confidentiality obligation are not only professional
violations but also criminal offences.
These problems can also arise in the inverse situation, i.e. when an
English lawyer is working in Europe. The English lawyer would be
subject to English reporting obligations and to German or French
secrecy/confidentiality obligations.
The issue of conflicting deontology can also become relevant
whenever the competent authorities or bodies from England check
whether English lawyers working in law firms in other European
countries have properly complied with their English reporting
obligations.
Another example of conflicting deontology can be found in child
abduction cases. One German lawyer in London went to jail when,
because of his German secrecy/confidentiality obligation, he refused to
comply with the order of an English court to disclose certain information
that the court held relevant in a child abduction case. Another German
lawyer in a similar case escaped arrest in a London court room only
because he produced a letter in which the German ambassador had
invited him to a luncheon in honour of the president of the German
Constitutional Court which was scheduled for right after the court
hearing-the judge shied away from a diplomatic conflict. The judge
immediately thereafter went on holiday. The lawyer in question was
positively surprised when another judge stepped in and lifted the
previous court order by which the lawyer had been put under disclosure
obligation. Further, he was negatively surprised when other orders
against him were lifted which had, in effect, mandated that his telephone
lines be tapped and his mail courier scrutinized by the telephone and
postal services.
It goes without saying that the aforesaid problems of conflicting
deontology have law firm dimension.
IV. How TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM?
When I was Head of the German CCBE Delegation, I suggested that
the CCBE should ask the EU Commission to introduce into the Lawyers'
Directives of 1977 and 1998 clear rules on regulatory conflicts as far as
work outside courts and authorities is concerned. Temporary cross-
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border work should be subject to home country regulation only-i.e., it
should be subject to the country of origin principle as it has long been
recognized in the freedom of goods area. Work in a cross-border office
should be subject to the host country regulation. This suggestion did not
find the necessary majority in the CCBE. Some bars even denied the
existence of a double deontology problem.
The country of origin principle is already to be found in connection
with advertising in the E-Commerce Directive, which is also applicable
to lawyers. It was included for temporary cross-border work in the 2004
draft of the 2006 Service Directive, which is a horizontal directive
applicable to all service providers. It was taken out of the draft because
it was rejected by a large majority of bars and law societies. They
insisted that their national regulation should be applied to foreign
lawyers working in their country and also to their own lawyers working
in foreign countries-a clear example of national egoism. It would have
been easy to say that there is enough equivalence in professional
regulation from country to country in Europe to introduce clear choice of
law provisions. In other areas, European politicians again and again
have had the courage to use sufficient equivalence as basis for clear
choice of law positions. Unfortunately, as regards regulation of the legal
profession, politicians are inclined to follow the legal profession.
Consequently, the problem is ultimately in the hands of the
European bar leaders who show less courage than national egoism.
The German Bar Association-the Deutscher Anwalt Verein-in
2006 suggested a so-called unilateral conflict rule to be included in the
German Federal Lawyers Act, according to which all cross-border
activity of a German lawyer should be subject only to the regulation of
the country of destination (host country) provided that the rules of such
country in such a case are applicable also to foreign lawyers. This
unilateral conflict rule would be applicable to temporary and established
cross-border activity. So far, this suggestion has not been taken up in
public discussion.
Another way of eliminating the problems of double deontology
would be to eliminate double deontology in the first place by
harmonizing, through EU legislation, the regulation of the legal
profession by the Member States as it applies to both domestic and crossborder activities of a lawyer. However, such an approach is even more
ambitious than the conflict of laws approach, and it is in my mind
completely unrealistic to expect such harmonization in the foreseeable
future. Giving up national sovereignty over the entire regulation of the
legal profession is even more difficult to accept than to make
concessions, through conflict of law rules, with respect to cross-border
activities only.
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It would be unfair to put all the blame on the bars and law societies.
Many parts of professional regulation are in the hands of the national
governments. In particular, in the area of conflicting deontology, e. g.
money laundering reporting versus professional secrecy/confidentiality,
these governments are rather unlikely to take up suggestions from the
bars and law societies to ease the problems of double deontology should
such suggestions ever be made.
Does that mean that the situation is entirely hopeless? Not quite so.
The International Bar Association and the CCBE have recently
commenced active work in the double deontology area. Both of them are
still in the beginning stages, namely the phase of fact finding through
questionnaires. Let us hope that this work will go beyond this first phase
and will result in concrete proposals, which will then be adopted by the
respective decision-making bodies.

